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This article analyses the way in which Latin American bond
spreads were affected by the changes in United States interest
rates in the second half of the 1990s. Empirical analysis
shows that, contrary to theory, in this period the spreads of
emerging market bonds and United States interest rates
moved in opposite directions; that there was financial
contagion; that contraction of liquidity and financial
contagion can offset the effects of those interest rates on the
spreads of emerging market bonds at times of economic and
financial turbulence and thus become the most important
factors in the evolution of those spreads; and that the
increased financial integration associated with the current
globalization process has heightened the vulnerability of the
developing economies to external shocks.
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I
Introduction
In the 1990s, as the world economy became
increasingly global, emerging markets grew to be more
dependent on developments in mature markets, and
especially in the U.S. economy. Capital flows to
emerging markets rose significantly, driven not only
by sound domestic macroeconomic policies and wide
structural reforms in these markets, but also by changing
conditions in industrial countries that encouraged
investors to diversify their portfolios.
Emerging market countries are affected by changes
in U.S. monetary policy, through its effects on the cost
and availability of funds, as well as on creditworthiness.
In addition to the impact of changes in U.S. interest
rates on local interest rates, bond spreads respond to
changes in the monetary policy of that country. In turn,
debt issuance and maturities respond to changes in
spreads.
This paper aims to examine empirically how
emerging debt markets (especially those of Latin
America) responded through the behaviour of bond
spreads to changes in U.S. interest rates in the second
half of the 1990s. It also reviews the effects of U.S.
interest rates on the bond spreads of emerging markets,
their interaction with the debt flows and terms of
borrowing of those markets, and the behaviour of other
high-yield assets. Section I is the present Introduction.
Section II focuses on how emerging market bond
spreads responded to movements in U.S. interest rates.
Section III analyses the U.S. high-yield market and
its behaviour during the period in question, while
section IV looks at Nasdaq’s performance and its
linkage with emerging market bond spreads,
particularly those of Latin America.
The empirical evidence indicates the presence of
financial contagion due to market turbulence during
most of the period. Emerging market bond spreads and
U.S. interest rates moved in opposite directions in the
second half of the 1990s, suggesting that the effect of
financial contagion on bond spreads worked in the
opposite direction to changes in U.S. interest rates.
Nevertheless, there were several episodes in the early
1990s, prior to the Mexican financial crisis, when
emerging market bond spreads and U.S. interest rates
moved together.
The focus of section V is on how contagion
changed over the period and the different market and
global conditions during the Russian default and the
Argentine crisis.1 These factors could explain the
different levels of contagion (very strong then but
hardly noticeable in the more recent period). Finally,
section VI presents a summary and the paper’s
conclusions.
II
United States interest rates and their effects
on emerging market bond spreads
It has been widely recognized that external factors play
a fundamental role in the availability of external
financing for emerging markets. For example, Calvo,
Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) stress the importance
of U.S. interest rates in driving the international capital
flows cycle and show that the surge of capital inflows
in the 1990s was closely associated with a combination
of three factors: lower U.S. interest rates, lower stock
market and real estate returns, and a slackening in
economic activity.
The authors wish to express their gratitude for the valuable
comments made on this paper by the Executive Secretary of ECLAC,
Mr. José Antonio Ocampo.
1
 The “Argentine crisis” refers to events that took place in that
country under the convertibility regime, in the period from October
2000 to December 2001, prior to the default on the nation’s debt.
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Fernández-Arias (1995) shows that international
interest rates have both a direct effect on the cost of
capital in an economy that is financially integrated in
the world, and also an indirect channel of influence, by
which they affect countries’ creditworthiness and hence
risk spreads and the cost of capital. This indirect channel
of transmission is due to the fact that a country’s
capacity to pay depends on the present value of its future
resources, which increases as the discount rate declines.
In countries with high-risk spreads, this indirect effect
may be large and may predominate over the direct
effect.
Evidence presented in Fernández-Arias (1995) and
Frankel and Roubini (2000) suggests that country-risk
and creditworthiness in many emerging markets are
indeed influenced by international interest rates in such
a way that the interest cycle in industrial countries is
amplified. During the Russian crisis, however, spreads
increased dramatically without there having been any
measurable change in domestic fundamentals and world
interest rates. Calvo and others (2001a) attribute this
change to a new residual external factor, which they
termed “financial contagion”.
All else being equal, lower U.S. interest rates would
ease debt service payments for emerging market
borrowers, reducing both the likelihood of default and
also, as a result, the corresponding risk premium
incorporated into bond spreads. Evidence for the early
1990s indicates that there were several episodes (prior
to the Mexican financial crisis) where spreads in
emerging markets and the U.S. federal funds target rate
moved together. In the second half of the 1990s,
however, correlation coefficients between emerging
market bond spreads and U.S. interest rates indicate
that they moved in opposite directions.
Theoretically, a rise in U.S. interest rates would
lead to an increase in emerging market spreads through
its impact on the ability of debtor countries to repay
loans. A rise in U.S. interest rates could also reduce
investors’ appetite for risk, reducing their exposure in
risky markets and the availability of financial resources
in borrowing countries.2 Conversely, a fall in U.S.
interest rates would ease debt service payments,
reducing the likelihood of default and, as a result,
reducing emerging market spreads. Another reason for
a positive correlation between a fall in U.S. interest rates
and in emerging market spreads is that investors,
seeking to enhance the overall return on their portfolios,
switch to emerging market debt whenever yields in
mature markets fall.
The empirical evidence on how U.S. monetary
policy affects emerging markets spreads, however, is
less conclusive, as we can see in tables 1 and 2. For the
period from March 1996 to September 2001 we find a
statistically significant (at 95% level of confidence)
negative (rather than positive) correlation of -0.6
between the 10-year U.S. Treasury Bond yield and
EMBI+ and EMBI+LAT spreads.3 The correlation between
emerging market spreads and the U.S. federal funds
target rate over the period was also negative and
statistically significant, albeit less strong: -0.3 for EMBI+
spreads and -0.5 for EMBI+LAT. In both cases, however,
the correlation was negative, meaning that the effect of
financial contagion on emerging market spreads worked
in the opposite direction to the changes in U.S. interest
rates and in the indebtedness indicator, more than
compensating for them.4
Many authors have argued that the episodes of
market turbulence in the second half of the 1990s were
periods of “liquidity crisis”. Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1998), Valdés (1997), and more recently Calvo and
others (2001a) have emphasized the financial aspects
of contagion, which would result primarily from the
interaction of investors with liquidity constraints who
had invested in emerging market assets, which are
potentially highly illiquid. The new feature of the
second half of the 1990s, therefore, would be that even
if an emerging market’s long-term capacity to pay was
sufficient to cover obligations, it “could be rendered
2
 See Kamin and von Kleist (1999).
3
 EMBI+ stands for J.P.Morgan’s “Emerging Markets Bond Index
Plus”. EMBI+LAT is the Latin American component of EMBI+.
4
 In much of the existing literature the yield on U.S. Treasury bonds
has been used as a proxy for U.S. monetary policy. According to
the IMF’s International Capital Markets Report (August 2001), the
10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield is an approximate benchmark
for the J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index, since the yield
on the EMBI+ will be approximately equal to the yield on the 10-
year U.S. Treasury bonds plus the EMBI+ interest rate spread as
reported by J.P. Morgan Chase. However, there are occasions when
shocks to U.S. Treasury yields are not necessarily the result of
changes in U.S. monetary policy. Tables 1 and 2 show, for example,
that the correlation between the yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury
bonds and the federal funds target rate was not always very marked
in the second half of the 1990s. Likewise, during the Asian crisis
short-term U.S. Treasury bond yields fluctuated dramatically even
in the absence of changes in U.S. monetary policy. The U.S. federal
funds target rate seems to be a more direct measure of the stance of
monetary policy in that country, so both measures –the yield on
10-year U.S. Treasury bonds and the U.S. federal funds target rate–
were used when calculating correlations with emerging market
spreads and debt flows to Latin America.
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TABLE 1
Correlations between U.S. interest rates and EMBI+ spreadsa
FED fund 10-year U.S. bonds EMBI+
(effective) (%) (%)
Whole period: March 1996-December 2001b
FED fund (effective) (%) 1
10-year U.S. bonds 0.47 1
EMBI+ (%) -0.33 -0.57 1
Period of easier U.S. monetary policy: June 1998-January 1999
FED fund (effective) (%) 1
10-year U.S. bonds 0.76 1
EMBI+ (%) -0.26 -0.52 1
Period of tighter U.S. monetary policy: May 1999-June 2000
FED fund (effective) (%) 1
10-year U.S. bonds 0.54 1
EMBI+ (%) -0.89 -0.63 1
Period of easier U.S. monetary policy:
November 2000-December 2001
FED fund (effective) (%) 1
10-year U.S. bonds 0.63 1
EMBI+ (%) -0.62 -0.67 1
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Federal Reserve (FED) and J. P. Morgan.
a
  EMBI+ = J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus.
b
  The starting point of the period was determined by the availability of data on EMBI+ spreads.
TABLE 2
Correlations between U.S. interest rates and the Latin American
component of the EMBI+ index
FED fund 10-year U.S. bonds EMBI+ LAT
(effective) (%) (%)b
Whole period: March 1996-December 2001a
FED fund (effective) (%) 1
10-year U.S. bonds 0.47 1
EMBI+ LAT (%) -0.53 -0.62 1
Period of easier U.S. monetary policy: June 1998-January 1999
FED fund (effective) (%) 1
10-year U.S. bonds 0.76 1
EMBI+ LAT (%) 0.19 -0.43 1
Period of tighter U.S. monetary policy: May 1999-June 2000
FED fund (effective) (%) 1
10-year U.S. bonds 0.54 1
EMBI+ LAT (%) -0.64 -0.71 1
Period of easier U.S. monetary policy:
November 2000-December 2001
FED fund (effective) (%) 1
10-year U.S. bonds 0.63 1
EMBI+ LAT (%) -0.77 -0.71 1
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Federal Reserve (FED) and J. P. Morgan.
a
 The starting point of the period was determined by the availability of data on EMBI+ spreads.
b
 EMBI+ LAT = Latin American component of EMBI+.
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insolvent if a critical mass of investors exited at once”
(Calvo and others, 2001a, p. 19). When facing liquidity
needs in one particular class of asset or country,
investors would tend to withdraw liquidity from another
class of assets or another country. A need for liquidity
could be precipitated by an exogenous shock, and would
become one of the main transmission channels of
financial turmoil across assets and countries.
If we isolate periods of changes in U.S. monetary
policy in the second half of the 1990s the correlations
between U.S. interest rates and emerging market spreads
are negative. These negative correlations between
emerging market spreads and cuts in the federal funds
target rate (June 1998 to January 1999, and November
2000 to December 2001) were concurrent with extreme
events in emerging markets, such as the Russian default
and the Turkey and Argentina crises in 2000 and 2001.
A sharp widening of spreads during these periods was
associated with an easing of monetary policies by the
Federal Reserve, which supports the liquidity crunch and
flight-to-quality argument: an asset substitution event that
would lead to a negative correlation between U.S. interest
rates and emerging market spreads.
The correlation was also negative in a period of
tighter monetary policy by the U.S. Federal Reserve
(May 1999 to June 2000). This may be explained by
the fact that economic fundamentals in emerging
markets, particularly in Latin America, were going
through a period of relatively calm, given the strength
of the United States economy and Brazil’s rapid
recovery from its currency crisis in January 1999. While
this strength was causing fears of inflation in U.S.
markets, it positively affected the prospects of emerging
market economies, increasing their creditworthiness.
The behaviour of debt flows to Latin America
during the period analysed here seems to support the
liquidity contraction and flight-to-quality argument,
since it seems to have been due more to changes in the
bond markets than to interest rates. There was a strong
and statistically significant (at 95% level of confidence)
positive (rather than negative) correlation between U.S.
interest rates and debt flows to Latin America, while
the correlations between those flows and the Latin
American component of EMBI+ were even more
pronounced (table 3).5 The correlation was particularly
5
 All the coefficients in table 3 are statistically significant at a 95%
level of confidence, except for the period corresponding to the
Argentine crisis. The data that could be obtained on debt flows to
Latin America are only on a quarterly basis, so all the correlation
coefficients were calculated on that basis.
TABLE 3
Correlations between debt flows to Latin America and U.S. interest rates
Latin American debt EMBI+LATa FED fund 10-year U.S. bonds
paper issued abroad (effective)
First quarter 1996-fourth quarter 2001
Latin American debt instruments
issued abroad 1
EMBI+ LAT -0.59 1
FED fund 0.19 -0.59 1
10-year U.S. bonds 0.53 -0.68 0.49 1
Second quarter 1997-first quarter 1999
(Asian, Russian and Brazilian crises)
Latin American debt instruments
issued abroad 1
EMBI+ LAT -0.80 1
FED fund 0.60 -0.70 1
10-year U.S. bonds 0.74 -0.86 0.71 1
Second quarter 2000-fourth quarter 2001
(Argentine crisis)
Latin American debt instruments
issued abroad 1
EMBI+ LAT -0.43 1
FED fund 0.13 -0.95 1
10-year U.S. bonds 0.20 -0.76 0.82 1
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  joint statistics from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), International Monetary Fund (IMF),
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and data from J. P. Morgan and the Federal Reserve.
a
 EMBI+ LAT = Latin American component of EMBI+.
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strong in the period of the Asian, Russian and Brazilian
crises (figure 1).
Basing their findings on the aftermath of the
Mexican crisis, Calvo and Reinhart (1996) indicated
that, other things being equal, increases in U.S. interest
rates were linked with capital outflows from Latin
America. In the same vein, Calvo and others (2001b)
concluded that, for the period from 1970 to 1999, in
years when U.S. monetary policy was easing (i.e., the
federal funds rate was declining), emerging markets in
all regions received a markedly higher volume of capital
inflows. When periods of easing (declining federal
funds target rate) and tightening (increasing federal
funds target rate) are isolated, however, the correlation
between debt flows to Latin America and U.S. interest
rates does not have the expected sign (table 4).
In the first period of easier U.S. monetary policy
(second quarter of 1998 to first quarter of 1999), the
correlation was positive (and statistically significant
at 95% level of confidence), rather than negative, so
that declining U.S. interest rates were associated with
capital outflows from Latin America. This period also
covered the Russian default and Brazilian devaluation,
and the correlation between debt flows and spreads
was very strong and negative (as well as statistically
significant at 95% level of confidence). Although U.S
interest rates were declining, Latin American spreads
were skyrocketing, and as a result debt flows to Latin
America were negative. These results corroborate the
liquidity crunch argument once again. Due to financial
contagion, there were capital outflows from Latin
America during a period of easier U.S. monetary
policy.
In the period of tighter U.S. monetary policy
(second quarter of 1999 to second quarter of 2000) and
in that of easier policies (third quarter of 2000 to fourth
quarter of 2001) the correlation between debt flows to
Latin America and the U.S. federal funds target rate
was weak, whereas the correlation with Latin American
spreads was negative and stronger.
FIGURE 1
Debt flows to Latin America,a U.S. interest rates














EMBI+ LAT FED fund (effective) 10-year U.S. bonds Latin America
Source:  ECLAC, on the basis of joint statistics from Bank for International Settlements (BIS), IMF, OECD and the World Bank on the external
debt, and data from the Federal Reserve and J.P. Morgan.
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A cross-section analysis for the period as a whole
(table 5) shows that Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
displayed the strongest correlations between debt flows,
spreads and U.S. interest rates. Since those countries
accounted for the biggest share of the EMBI+ during
that period, the correlations between debt flows to Latin
America and Latin EMBI+ spreads were heavily
influenced by developments in them.6 The correlations
between debt flows, spreads and U.S. interest rates
during the period of the Asian, Russian and Brazilian
crises are stronger, especially in the case of Brazil. The
fact that the correlation between debt flows to Latin
America, spreads and U.S. interest rates is weaker for
the period covering the Turkey and Argentina crises
gives support to the argument that financial contagion
in this period was not as strong as it was during the
Russian crisis (tables 6 and 7).
6
 After Argentina’s debt default in December 2001, its share in the
J.P.Morgan EMBI+ index fell substantially.
TABLE 4
Correlations between debt flows to Latin America and U.S. interest
rates in periods of easier and tighter U.S. monetary policy
Latin American debt EMBI+ LATa FED fund 10-year U.S. bonds
instruments issued abroad (effective)
Period of easier U.S. monetary policy:
second quarter 1998-first quarter 1999
Latin American debt
instruments issued abroad 1
EMBI+ LAT -0.94 1
FED fund (effective) 0.68 -0.49 1
10-year U.S. bonds 0.93 -0.75 0.79 1
Period of tighter U.S. monetary policy:
second quarter 1999-second quarter 2000
Latin American debt
instruments issued abroad 1
EMBI+ LAT -0.55 1
FED fund (effective) -0.07 -0.65 1
10-year U.S. bonds 0.20 -0.78 0.74 1
Period of easier U.S. monetary policy:
third quarter 2000-fourth quarter 2001
Latin American debt
instruments issued abroad 1
EMBI+ LAT -0.43 1
FED fund (effective) 0.11 -0.94 1
10-year U.S. bonds 0.21 -0.81 0.85 1
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of joint statistics from Bank for International Settlements (BIS), IMF, OECD and the World Bank on the external
debt, and data from the Federal Reserve and J.P. Morgan.
a
 EMBI+ LAT = Latin American component of EMBI+.
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TABLE 5
Correlations between debt flows to selected Latin American countries,
spreads and U.S. interest rates, first quarter 1996-fourth quarter 2001
EMBI+ EMBI+ EMBI+ EMBI+ EMBI+ EMBI+ EMBI+ LATIN EMBI+ FED 10-year
Argentina ARG Brazil BRA Colombia COL Ecuador ECU Mexico MEX Peru PER Venezuela VEN AMERICA LATa fund U.S.
(effective) bonds
Argentina 1.00
EMBI+ ARG -0.24 1.00
Brazil 0.38 -0.32 1.00
EMBI+ BRA -0.26 0.46 -0.67 1.00
Colombia 0.57 0.26 0.08 -0.04 1.00
EMBI+ COL -0.22 -0.25 -0.32 -0.14 -0.44 100
Ecuador 0.02 -0.12 0.28 -0.28 -0.21 -0.13 1.00
EMBI+ ECU 0.02 0.05 -0.09 0.42 -0.11 -0.13 -0.11 1.00
Mexico 0.10 -0.31 0.33 -0.39 0.26 -0.29 0.26 -0.11 1.00
EMBI+ MEX -0.24 -0.12 -0.47 0.57 -0.18 0.05 -0.08 0.08 0.12 1.00
Peru -0.17 -0.08 -0.07 0.13 -0.37 -0.44 0.38 -0.11 0.02 0.21 1.00
EMBI+ PER -0.11 0.32 -0.60 0.77 0.25 0.48 -0.41 0.20 -0.49 0.47 -0.11 1.00
Venezuela 0.24 -0.11 0.28 -0.34 -0.15 -0.42 -0.02 -0.20 0.03 -0.32 -0.10 -0.42 1.00
EMBI+ VEN -0.26 0.32 -0.58 0.87 0.00 0.01 -0.24 0.38 -0.22 0.74 0.16 0.80 -0.33 1.00
Latin America 0.78 -0.37 0.74 -0.58 0.47 -0.36 0.23 -0.10 0.59 -0.30 -0.13 -0.48 0.36 -0.48 1.00
EMBI+ LAT -0.30 0.69 -0.62 0.94 0.06 -0.21 -0.27 0.36 -0.40 0.50 0.05 0.77 -0.34 0.88 -0.59 1.00
FED fund
(effective) 0.03 -0.82 0.30 -0.43 -0.30 0.54 0.00 0.11 0.21 -0.02 -0.03 -0.17 0.05 -0.21 0.19 -0.59 1.00
10-year
U.S. bonds 0.18 -0.53 0.53 -0.70 -0.04 -0.02 0.46 0.02 0.58 -0.14 -0.18 -0.66 0.09 -0.51 0.53 -0.68 0.49 1.00
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of joint statistics from Bank for International Settlements (BIS), IMF, OECD and the World Bank on the external
debt, and data from the Federal Reserve and J.P. Morgan.
a
  EMBI+ LAT = Latin American component of EMBI+.
TABLE 6
Correlations between debt flows to selected Latin American countries,
spreads and U.S. interest rates, second quarter 1997-first quarter 1999
EMBI+ EMBI+ EMBI+ EMBI+ EMBI+ EMBI+ LATIN EMBI+ FED fund 10-year
Argentina ARG Brazil BRA Ecuador ECU Mexico MEX Peru PER Venezuela VEN AMERICA LATa (effective) U.S. bonds
Argentina 1.00
EMBI+ ARG -0.53 1.00
Brazil 0.66 -0.87 1.00
EMBI+ BRA -0.48 0.95 -0.89 1.00
Ecuador -0.11 -0.43 0.49 -0.40 1.00
EMBI+ ECU -0.42 0.90 -0.81 0.97 -0.27 1.00
Mexico 0.07 -0.57 0.67 -0.57 0.94 -0.42 1.00
EMBI+ MEX -0.51 0.97 -0.85 0.97 -0.39 0.89 -0.55 1.00
Peru -0.39 0.02 -0.02 0.12 0.45 0.04 0.25 0.23 1.00
EMBI+ PER -0.50 0.99 -0.85 0.93 -0.44 0.86 -0.57 0.97 0.04 1.00
Venezuela 0.66 -0.49 0.44 -0.46 0.01 -0.41 0.21 -0.47 -0.33 -0.42 1.00
EMBI+ VEN -0.47 0.97 -0.80 0.95 -0.34 0.89 -0.47 0.99 0.19 0.97 -0.39 1.00
Latin America 0.78 -082 0.95 -0.80 0.47 -0.69 0.66 -0.80 -0.13 -0.79 0.65 -0.72 1.00
EMBI+ LAT -0.50 0.98 -0.88 0.99 -0.40 0.94 -0.56 0.99 0.12 0.97 -0.46 0.98 -0.80 1.00
FED fund (effective) 0.32 -0.57 0.66 -0.78 0.24 -0.78 0.44 -0.67 -0.35 -0.51 0.37 -0.61 0.60 -0.70 1.00
10-year U.S. bonds 0.28 -0.82 0.74 -0.86 0.70 -0.76 0.79 -0.86 -0.08 -0.81 0.47 -0.81 0.74 -0.86 0.71 1.00
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of joint statistics from Bank for International Settlements (BIS), IMF, OECD and the World Bank on the external
debt, and data from the Federal Reserve and J.P. Morgan.
a
 EMBI+ LAT = Latin American component of EMBI+.
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III
Emerging markets versus
U.S. high-yield corporate bonds
Bond spreads showed a tendency to deterioration after
the Asian crisis. Although emerging market bond
spreads tended to recover soon after each of the periods
of crisis, the recovery was never in full, and as a result
the level of bond spreads is now a lot higher than in
1997, before the crisis. Calvo and others (2001a)
consider three kinds of explanations for this
deterioration, based on a reassessment of countries’
prospects, changes in the involvement of the official
sector, and problems in financial markets.
The most immediate explanation for the increase
in spreads in the second half of the 1990s is that
investors perceived worse country prospects in
emerging markets, including Latin America. However,
spreads not only increased in emerging countries in
general, but also increased substantially for U.S. high-
yield corporate bonds (figure 2). The correlation
between EMBI+LAT spreads and Merrill Lynch U.S. High
Yield Master Index spreads was 0.6 for the period as a
whole, but much stronger (0.8) for the period of the
Asian, Russian and Brazilian crises (table 8).7
The results suggest that the causes of the
deterioration of bond spreads after the Asian crisis may
be unrelated to reassessments of countries’ prospects.
7
 The correlation coefficients given in table 8 between the spreads
of high-yield U.S. bonds and the EMBI+LAT index are statistically
significant at a 95% level of confidence.
TABLE 7
Correlations between debt flows to selected Latin American countries,
spreads and U.S. interest rates, second quarter 2000-fourth quarter 2001
EMBI+ EMBI+ EMBI+ EMBI+ EMBI+ EMBI+ EMBI+ LATIN EMBI+ FED 10-year
Argentina ARG Brazil BRA Colombia COL Ecuador ECU Mexico MEX Peru PER Venezuela VEN AMERICA LATa fund U.S.
(effective) bonds
Argentina 1.00
EMBI+ ARG -0.25 1.00
Brazil 0.38 -0.54 1.00
EMBI+ BRA -0.18 0.79 -0.54 1.00
Colombia 0.72 0.24 0.16 0.10 1.00
EMBI+ COL -0.24 -0.69 0.02 -0.75 -0.56 1.00
Ecuador 0.14 0.21 -0.14 0.30 -0.17 -0.03 1.00
EMBI+ ECU 0.19 -0.32 -0.0 -0.33 -0.39 0.43 0.24 1.00
Mexico 0.14 -0.11 0.44 -0.61 0.38 0.11 -0.60 -0.02 1.00
EMBI+ MEX -0.43 -0.15 -0.56 0.00 -0.45 0.35 -0.48 0.35 -0.12 1.00
Peru 0.39 0.20 0.38 0.19 0.33 -0.65 -0.17 0.19 0.26 -0.17 1.00
EMBI+ PER 0.26 -0.21 -0.13 0.04 0.40 0.05 -0.08 -0.55 -0.25 -0.07 -0.55 1.00
Venezuela 0.02 0.19 0.07 0.18 0.43 -0.52 -0.83 -0.37 0.41 0.28 0.53 0.02 1.00
EMBI+ VEN -0.37 0.84 -0.85 0.72 -0.10 -0.35 0.28 0.10 -0.32 0.28 0.02 -0.28 -0.02 1.00
Latin America 0.91 -0.31 0.64 -0.41 0.74 -0.19 -0.11 0.08 0.51 -0.50 0.48 0.11 0.19 -0.55 1.00
EMBI+ LAT -0.25 0.90 -0.59 0.98 0.12 -0.75 0.26 -0.33 -0.47 -0.02 0.20 -0.07 0.20 0.81 -0.43 1.00
FED fund
(effective) 0.00 -0.90 0.43 -0.92 -0.41 0.90 -0.16 0.39 0.27 0.17 -0.39 0.03 -0.36 -0.69 0.13 -0.95 1.00
10-year U.S. bonds 0.19 -0.70 0.34 -0.74 -0.44 0.76 0.29 0.76 0.10 0.02 -0.16 -0.29 -0.64 -0.42 0.20 -0.76 0.82 1.00
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of joint statistics from Bank for International Settlements (BIS), IMF, OECD and the World Bank on the external
debt, and data from the Federal Reserve and J.P. Morgan.
a
 EMBI+ LAT = Latin American component of EMBI+.
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Likewise, the explanation based on changes in the
involvement of the official sector cannot account for
the increase in high-yield bond spreads. The results
therefore lend support to the liquidity crunch argument
made in the previous section. Investors specializing in
high-yield investments taint all high-yield markets
through contagion when attempting to hedge through
diversification.
Investors have many choices, and do not need to
swap into high-yield corporates when they get out of
emerging markets debt. However, on some occasions
heightened risk in emerging markets induces investors
to lower their risk profile in general and switch to
investment grade bonds or other instruments. During
the Russian crisis, in the August-October 1998 period,
for example, the Merrill Lynch High Yield Master Index
widened by 2.75 percentage points against treasury
bonds, even though corporate credit quality in the
United States was not central to the problem affecting
financial markets.
Spread over U.S. EMBI+ LAT EMBI+ non-LAT
high-yield bonds
Source:  ECLAC, on the basis of data from Merrill Lynch and J.P. Morgan.
FIGURE 2
Merrill Lynch U.S. High-yield Master Index
vs. the J.P. Morgan EMBI+
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IV
Volatility in equity markets: the linkage
between Latin American market interest
rate spreads and the Nasdaq
International equity portfolios have been increasingly
managed from a sectoral rather than geographic
perspective, as financial and economic globalization
and the worldwide information technology boom
increased the importance of global factors in
determining equity prices. Portfolio managers tend to
rely on similar risk-management strategies, so that when
equity volatility increases, a number of such strategies
may prompt them to reduce their overall equity
exposure by selling shares in many national markets
simultaneously.
Short-run correlations between emerging and U.S.
equity markets have historically been high, though
volatile, but since late 1998 a close and unusual
association between world equity (U.S. equity in
particular) and emerging bond markets can be noticed
as well (figure 3).
Latin American debt markets displayed a stronger
correlation with the Nasdaq Composite index after mid-
1998 as the technology, media and telecommunications
(TMT) phenomenon became global. The correlation
between Nasdaq monthly closing prices and EMBI+LAT
spreads was a negative 0.34 from March 1996 to August
1998, subsequently increasing to a negative 0.7. The
correlation was especially strong throughout 2000 and
most of 2001 (table 9).8
TABLE 8
Merrill Lynch U.S. High-yield Master Index
compared with the J.P. Morgan EMBI+
(March 1996 to December 2001)
Spread over U.S. EMBI+ EMBI+ LATa EMBI+ non-LATb
high-yield bonds
Spread over U.S. high-yield bonds 1.00
EMBI+ 0.48 1.00
EMBI+ LAT 0.61 0.90 1.00
EMBI+ non-LAT 0.23 0.88 0.59 1.00
September 1997 – November 1999
Spread over U.S. high-yield bonds 1.00
EMBI+ 0.86 1.00
EMBI+ LAT 0.79 0.98 1.00
EMBI+ non-LAT 0.92 0.97 0.91 1.00
October 2000 – December 2001
Spread over U.S. high-yield bonds 1.00
EMBI+ 0.56 1.00
EMBI+ LAT 0.49 0.97 1.00
EMBI+ non-LAT 0.17 -0.14 -0.36 1.00
Source:  ECLAC, on the basis of data from Merrill Lynch and J.P. Morgan.
a  EMBI+ LAT = Latin American component of EMBI+.
b
 EMBI+ non-LAT = Non-Latin American component of EMBI+.
8
 The correlation coefficients between the Nasdaq monthly closing
prices and the EMBI+LAT spreads are statistically significant at a
95% level of confidence.
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TABLE 9
Nasdaq prices vs. EMBI+ spreads
EMBI+ non-LAT EMBI+ LAT Nasdaq end-of- EMBI+ non-LAT EMBI+ LAT Nasdaq Moving
month closing price Àverage MA =0
March 1996- March 1996-
August 1998 August 1998
EMBI+ non-LAT 1 EMBI+ non-LAT 1
EMBI+ LAT 0.77 1 EMBI+ LAT 0.77 1
Nasdaq closing pricea 0.21 -0.34 1 Nasdaq MA = 0 0.50 -0.09 1
August 1998- August 1998-
December 2001 December 2001
EMBI+ non-LAT 1 EMBI+ non-LAT 1
EMBI+ LAT 0.30 1 EMBI+ LAT 0.30 1
Nasdaq closing pricea -0.13 -0.74 1 Nasdaq MA = 0 -0.73 -0.72 1
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from Bloomberg Financial Markets and J.P. Morgan.
a
 Closing price on last day of month.
FIGURE 3
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V
Did contagion change over the period?
possibility for sovereigns”. Investors exited at once, and
Mexico was rendered insolvent.
Many countries lost access to international capital
markets for a time as a result of Mexico’s crisis.
Financial contagion was felt throughout Latin America
in bond spreads and other indicators, and again with
the subsequent financial crises that affected emerging
markets in the second half of the 1990s. This section
will focus on financial contagion in Latin American
markets after the Mexican crisis, and the way it changed
over the period. The evidence suggests that there were
different shades of contagion.
The sensitivity to contagion of selected Latin
American countries in the crisis episodes of the second
half of the 1990s is shown in figure 4. The percentage
increases in bond spreads during the month that marked
the beginning of the various financial crises that took
Emerging markets experienced a significant wave of
capital inflows in the 1990s. Developments in the
United States, especially the decline in U.S. interest
rates, were closely associated with the surge of capital
flows in the early years of the decade. In the case of
Latin America, the impulse provided by declining U.S.
interest rates joined with the 1989 Brady Plan to restore
the region’s access to international capital markets. The
Brady bond exchange created a secondary market for
sovereign bonds in Latin America, which allowed high-
risk portfolios to include Latin American risk and
increased investors’ interest in the region.
The second half of the 1990s was marked by
financial crises. The Mexican crisis of late 1994 came
as a surprise, given that Mexico’s long-term capacity
to pay was sufficient to cover its obligations. However,
bondholders refused to roll over short-term public
bonds, and Mexico was unable to pay its short-term
obligations. As pointed out by Calvo and others (2001a,
p. 19), “liquidity crises were shown to be a distinct
Again, the results here reinforce the argument made
in previous sections that when faced by losses in one
type of risky asset or losses in a particular emerging
market, investors seeking liquidity tend to sell other
positions or other emerging market assets, even if these
have not suffered losses. Emerging market bonds are
regarded as a risky asset class, and movements in the
Nasdaq are seen as an indicator of the willingness of
investors to take risky trading positions. A sharp fall in
the Nasdaq is often taken as a signal that risk aversion
has increased, and portfolio managers take action
accordingly, selling emerging market holdings.
“Crossover investors”, who do not have dedicated
allocations to emerging markets but instead “cross over”
into (and out of) emerging market assets, retrench from
emerging markets during times of volatility in an
attempt to limit their risk exposure. Some mutual funds
may hold both emerging market bonds and Nasdaq
equity positions, and may reduce one position when
the other suffers losses. Investors specializing in high-
yield investments, as mentioned earlier, contaminate
all high-yield markets through contagion when
attempting to obtain liquidity from other asset positions
in their portfolio.
The market turbulence in Argentina during 2000
and 2001 illustrates the respective roles of domestic
political developments in emerging markets and
economic developments in mature markets today. For
example, the decline of 30% in the Nasdaq
Composite’s returns in April and May of 2000 spilled
over into Argentina’s stock market, and this indirectly
pressured Argentina’s bond markets by pushing the
shares of sovereign securities in pension fund
portfolios above the legal limit, forcing them to curtail
purchases, which contributed to the widening of
Argentina’s secondary market spreads.9 Similarly, in
October 2000 Argentina’s political turmoil and
financing difficulties were exacerbated by a sell-off
in high-yield bond markets.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the
correlations between the Nasdaq and EMBI+ spreads
were essentially of a short-term and unstable nature.
For example, while in 2000 the EMBI+ gave a total return
of 16%, the Nasdaq fell by 39%.
9
 See IMF (2000).
C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 8  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 296
UNITED STATES INTEREST RATES, LATIN AMERICAN DEBT AND F INANCIAL
CONTAGION  •  INES BUSTILLO AND HELVIA VELLOSO
place in the second half of the 1990s show that Latin
American spreads increased significantly during the
Asian crisis, skyrocketed with the Russian default, and
increased more moderately during the Argentine crisis.
According to this figure, contagion seemed to be
strongest during the Russian crisis but much more
limited during the Argentine crisis.
The Asian crisis hit Latin America not only
through trade channels, depressing export commodity
prices, but also through significant financial contagion
in bond spreads. The Latin American component of
J.P. Morgan’s EMBI+ increased 74% in October 1997,
by almost 250 basis points. With the Russian crisis,
Latin America was hit even harder. Although Russia
is a country with very few real linkages with Latin
America, the financial contagion was huge. The
EMBI+LAT increased 140% in August 1998, by almost
775 basis points. As already noted, many authors
pointed out that highly leveraged markets caused
financial contagion, so that the accumulated losses due
to the Russian default led to a liquidity crunch. When
Russia defaulted on its bonds, investors everywhere
faced the need to raise liquidity, causing them to sell
their asset holdings. They sold bonds and stocks of
other countries in their portfolio, as well as other
classes of assets. As suggested by Kaminsky and
Reinhart (2000), the analysis of the Russian crisis in
1998 reveals that there were a variety of withdrawals
from risk-taking, which drastically reduced market
liquidity and increased volatility.
In Argentina’s crisis, financial contagion was much
more modest. This time, markets were not as highly
leveraged as they were at the time of the Russian default,
and did not face liquidity constraints as severe as in the
previous crisis. The market technicals were better in
the emerging markets asset class, as crossover investors
had already reduced their emerging market positions
substantially in past months. Volatility did not spike
and was segmented, being a lot higher for Argentina,
but at much lower levels in Brazil and Russia. Dedicated
funds also reduced their investments in Argentina for a
while, and to some extent in Brazil as well.
FIGURE 4
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There were also a number of other differences
between the Argentine crisis and the Russian default.
On one hand, the world economy was in worse shape
when Argentina’s crisis unfolded, as it was going
through a synchronized slowdown. Merrill Lynch’s
technical measure of investor risk appetites, for
example, was on the defensive side by historical
standards, implying that investors would seek risk only
if there was some general improvement in the world
environment. This time, there were fewer countries with
fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rates: systems that were
prone to trouble in previous periods. Performance,
volatility and creditworthiness diverged across different
countries in emerging markets, suggesting that investors
were differentiating among countries on the basis of
their fundamentals. Finally, Argentina’s crisis was much
more foreseen and foretold than previous emerging
markets crises (including that of Russia in August
1998), which had had the element of surprise, causing
financial markets to react strongly to unanticipated
events.
Finally, it is worth noting that contagion during the
Asian crisis, the Russian default and the Brazilian
devaluation period was widespread across countries,
regions and assets, but this has not been the case in the
Argentine crisis. For example, the correlation between the
Latin American and non-Latin American components of
the EMBI+ index was positive by 0.9 in the periods of the
Asian crisis, the Russian default and the Brazilian
devaluation, whereas during the Argentine crisis it was
negative by 0.4.10 Once again, the evidence reinforces the
notion that investors’ liquidity constraints and withdrawal
from risk were responsible for the widespread nature of
financial contagion during the Asian, Russian and Brazilian
crises, while in the more recent period investors were not
faced with severe liquidity constraints. According to
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), in the previous periods
of crisis not only emerging markets (the periphery), but
also mature markets (the centre) were affected, since
investors were so highly leveraged. They conclude that if
the shock never reaches the center, it is doubtful that it
can become widespread across countries and regions.
VI
Summary and conclusions
This paper examined empirically, through the behaviour
of bond spreads in secondary markets and new debt
issuance and maturity, how emerging debt markets were
influenced by changes in U.S. interest rates in the
second half of the 1990s.11 In this period, bond
financing became increasingly important to Latin
American countries, because of the creation of a
secondary market for sovereign bonds with the Brady
bond exchange. On average, bond financing became
the second major source of funding in Latin America
in the 1990s.12
The empirical analysis shows that, unlike what
might be expected from theory, emerging market bond
spreads and U.S. interest rates moved in opposite
directions, perhaps reflecting the financial contagion
due to the market turmoil that characterized most of
the second half of the 1990s and suggesting that the
effect of financial contagion on bond spreads worked
in the opposite direction to changes in U.S. interest
rates. From March 1996 to December 2001 there was a
significant negative correlation of -0.6 between the 10-
year U.S. Treasury Bond yield and the EMBI+ and
EMBI+LAT spreads; the correlation between emerging
market bond spreads and the U.S. federal funds target
rate over the same period was also negative, albeit less
strong (-0.3 for the EMBI+ and -0.5 for its Latin
American component).
Debt flows to Latin America seemed to respond
more to movements in spreads, rather than to U.S.
10
 See table 8 in section III.
11
 Much of the existing literature on the determination of emerging
market spreads examines the behaviour of launch spreads, rather
than secondary market spreads. Secondary market sovereign
spreads, however, can behave differently from launch spreads, as
they reflect current market conditions, as well as investors’
expectations concerning the ability of debtor governments to service
existing debts. Spreads for bonds that are actively traded in
secondary markets thus reflect the perceived risk of emerging
market debt. Earlier work based on secondary market developments
includes Dooley, Fernández-Arias and Kletzer (1996), Calvo,
Leiderman and Reinhart (1996), and Arora and Cerisola (2000 and
2001). 12 See Bustillo and Velloso (2000).
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interest rates in the period analysed here. When isolating
periods of easing (declining federal funds target rate)
and tightening (increasing federal funds target rate) U.S.
monetary policy, the correlation between debt flows to
Latin America and U.S. interest rates did not show the
expected sign. There was a positive (rather than
negative) correlation between U.S. interest rates and
debt flows to Latin America. Latin American securities
issued abroad showed a positive correlation of 0.5 with
10-year U.S. Treasury Bond yields. The correlation was
particularly strong in the periods of the Asian, Russian
and Brazilian crises.
Movements in high-yield bond spreads were
strongly and positively associated with movements in
emerging market bond spreads during the Asian crisis,
the Russian default and the Brazilian devaluation, with
a correlation coefficient of 0.9. The correlation between
the Nasdaq Composite and EMBI+LAT spreads was
more marked after mid-1998 ?because of globalization
in the areas of technology, media and
telecommunications? and was especially strong
throughout 2000 and 2001.
The results corroborate the view that there was
financial contagion and that it was primarily the result
of the interaction of investors facing liquidity
constraints who had invested in emerging market assets,
which are potentially illiquid. A need of liquidity could
be precipitated by an exogenous shock, and would
become one of the main transmission channels of
financial turmoil across assets and countries. When
facing liquidity needs in one particular class of assets
or a particular country, investors would tend to withdraw
liquidity from another class of assets or other countries.
Contagion changed over the period, being strongest
during the Russian crisis, and more limited in the
Argentine crisis. The level of market leverage (high in
the first case and lower in the latter) seems to be one of
the main reasons explaining why there was so little
contagion in the Argentine crisis. This suggests that
emerging markets can dispose of some room to deal
with the dynamics of the world capital markets if they
pursue strong debt management policies to improve
debt profiles, as well as sound fiscal and monetary
policies.
The correlation coefficients observed support the
notion that although U.S. monetary policy is a
fundamental element in determining country risk,
liquidity constraints and financial contagion may offset
the influence of U.S. interest rates on emerging market
bond spreads and may become the main factor
influencing the behaviour of spreads in times of
economic and financial turmoil. The coefficients also
give strength to the belief that the greater financial
integration that has characterized the current process
of globalization has increased the vulnerability of
developing countries to external shocks, since they have
to respond to sudden changes in world capital market
conditions.
The financial contagion of the late 1990s is
indicative of the international financial system’s serious
problems of governance. Various ECLAC studies have
noted that the instability of the international financial
system is associated with the marked asymmetry that
exists between the rapid development of world financial
markets and the absence of adequate forms of
macroeconomic and financial governance at the global
level. Given the magnitude and intensity of external
financing cycles, the high risk of contagion, and the
devastating effects of the volatility of financial markets,
a global institutional framework capable of dealing with
volatility when it occurs is required.13
Although the correlation coefficients observed
support the notion of a liquidity crunch and a flight to
quality, other causes cannot be ruled out without first
of all carrying out more studies and making further
efforts to determine the possible influence of other
variables. Future studies could also analyse the role
played by the length of time that elapses before bond
spreads react to changes in United States interest rates:
an issue not dealt with in the empirical analysis made
in this article.
Finally, it should be noted that the contagion
problems deriving from a liquidity crunch are only one
of many features of present-day financial markets which
have tended to accentuate their volatility. Other features,
which are outside the scope of this study, are:
insufficient regulation of the activities of both the
banking sector and institutional investors and secondary
market agents; the procyclical bias of the prevailing
rules; the tendency for a number of agents to use the
same risk assessment systems, thereby increasing the
correlation between the financial behaviour of often
disparate instruments; the tendency of institutional
investors to assess results over short periods, and the
procyclical behaviour of risk assessment agencies.14
13
 See Ocampo (2000 and 2002).
14
 See ECLAC (2002), p. 60.
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